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Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on the dimensions shaping the dynamics of technology. We present a 
model where the knowledge stock of a country grows over time as a function of three main 
factors: its innovation intensity, its technological infrastructures and its human capital. The 
latter two variables contribute to determine the absorptive capacity of a country as well as 
its innovative ability. Based on this theoretical framework, we carry out an empirical 
analysis that investigates the dynamics of technology in a large sample of developed and 
developing economies in the last two-decade period, and studies its relationships with the 
growth of income per capita in a dynamic panel model setting. The results indicate that the 
cross-country distributions of technological infrastructures and human capital have 
experienced a process of convergence, whereas the innovative intensity is characterized by 
increasing polarization between rich and poor economies. Thus, while the conditions for 
catching up have generally improved, the increasing innovation gap represents a major 
factor behind the observed differences in income per capita. 
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1. Introduction 
A recent body of research in applied growth theory focuses on the issue of cross-country 
heterogeneity, and points out the great diversity of countries’ characteristics and growth 
behaviour. The study of the variety of economic growth patterns across countries does now 
constitute a central research theme in growth empirics (Temple, 1999; Islam, 2003; Durlauf 
et al., 2005). 
One strand of research in this tradition has in particular studied the evolution of the world 
income distribution and pointed out the existence of increasing polarization between the 
club of rich and the group of poor countries (Quah, 1996a; 1996b; 1996c; 1997). Empirical 
analyses investigating the so-called emerging twin-peaks in the world distribution of 
income have flourished rapidly in the last decade (Bianchi, 1997; Jones, 1997; Paap and van 
Dijk, 1998; Anderson, 2004). 
What are the factors that may explain these empirical findings on clustering and income 
polarization? One major explanation, recently proposed by growth models in the 
technology-gap (or distance-to-frontier) tradition, points to innovation and the international 
diffusion of new technologies as the possible sources of income polarization and 
convergence clubs (Papageorgiou, 2002; Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005; Stokke, 2008).1 
More specifically, technology-gap models argue that two main dimensions determine the 
ability of a country to catch up. The first is its absorptive capacity, i.e. its ability to imitate 
foreign advanced technologies. The second is its innovative capability, namely the extent to 
which the country is able to produce new advanced knowledge.  
While the importance of absorptive capacity and innovative ability for the growth process is 
widely acknowledged in modelling exercises, the empirical literature has not yet achieved a 
systematic understanding of how these two dimensions evolve over time, and how the 
technological dynamics is related to the evolution of the world distribution of income. 
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This paper carries out an empirical study that has two interrelated objectives. First, it 
investigates the dynamics of technology by focusing on the evolution of innovative 
activities and absorptive capacity, considering a large sample of countries in the last two-
decade period. Secondly, it studies the link between technological and economic dynamics. 
By analysing the evolution of the world distribution of technological capabilities, we may 
thus investigate the extent to which technology is an important factor to explain the pattern 
of increasing income polarization and emerging twin-peaks, and identify the technology 
dimensions that are more closely related to the dynamics of GDP per capita.  
We first present a simple model where the technology dynamics of a country depends on 
three main factors: its innovative intensity, its human capital and its technological 
infrastructures. The latter two factors are assumed to shape the dynamics of both, the 
country’s absorptive capacity and the productivity of its R&D sector. The model is 
therefore rooted in the technology-gap tradition. However, differently from the standard 
formulation where absorptive capacity only depends on human capital (Benhabib and 
Spiegel, 1994; 2005), our model adds a new dimension by pointing out the importance of 
technological infrastructures for the catching up process. 
Our empirical analysis of this model proceeds in three steps. First, we employ a set of 
indicators to measure the three technology dimensions pointed out by the model, and carry 
out a hierarchical cluster analysis that explores the existence of various groups of countries 
differing in terms of their levels of technological development. The results of the cluster 
analysis show the existence of three technology clubs with strikingly different technological 
characteristics and, relatedly, two large technology gaps separating these country groups. 
Secondly, we shift the focus to the study of the dynamics of these technology clubs, and 
make use of four different notions of technological convergence. Two of them are the well-
known concepts of β-convergence and σ-convergence. The other two are new notions of 
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convergence that we put forward in order to refine these standard definitions. The first 
refinement (Q-convergence) is based on the estimation of quantile regressions for different 
percentiles of the conditional distributions of the technology growth rate, while the second 
(cluster convergence) is based on the analysis of the dynamics of the technology gaps over 
time. Finally, the third step of our empirical analysis is to investigate the implications of 
this technology dynamics for the growth of GDP per capita, and to estimate our technology-
gap model in a dynamic panel model setting for the period 1970-2000.  
The empirical results indicate that the cross-country distributions of human capital and 
technological infrastructures have experienced a process of convergence, while the 
evolution of innovative intensity is characterized by increasing polarization between rich 
and poor countries. Thus, while the conditions for catching up have generally improved, the 
increasing innovation gap represents a major factor behind the observed differences in 
income per capita.  
 
 
2. The model  
The simple model presented in this section provides the theoretical framework of the paper. 
It focuses on technology as a major growth factor, and analyses the channels through which 
the dynamics of technology fosters the dynamics of income per capita. The growth of the 
knowledge stock of country i (Ai) is the sum of two components, knowledge creation (KCi) 
and knowledge imitation (KIi): 
 
ΔAi/Ai = KCi + KIi                                                                                                       (1) 
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The knowledge imitation term is driven by the dynamics of the international diffusion of 
technologies. In line with previous technology-gap models (e.g. Benhabib and Spiegel, 
1994 and 2005; Papageorgiou, 2002; Galor, 2005; Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005; 
Stokke, 2008), we assume that knowledge imitation (KIi) depends on two factors: the 
technological distance from the frontier (GAPi), which provides opportunities for catching 
up through the imitation of foreign advanced technologies, and the absorptive capacity (δi), 
which affects the extent to which these imitation opportunities are exploited by each 
country: 
 
KIi = GAPiβ · δi                                                                                                                     (2) 
 
The next equation endogeneizes absorptive capacity. The latter is assumed to depend on 
two related factors, human capital (HKi) and technological infrastructures (TIi): 
 
δi = TIiδ1 · HKiδ2                                                                                                                     (3) 
 
The human capital component (HKi) is the one that is commonly emphasized in 
technology-gap growth models. Besides, we argue that a second important factor affecting 
the absorptive capacity of a nation is its level of technological infrastructures (TIi). This is 
technology that is embodied in the infrastructures that support productive activities and that 
enables the communication between economic agents. When new technologies are 
produced, they are progressively used to improve the infrastructures of the economy, and 
this has the effect of increasing the efficiency of production in all industrial sectors that 
make use of these infrastructures.2 Technological infrastructures represent therefore a 
crucial factor affecting the absorptive capacity of a country. Human skills would in fact be 
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useless without the possibility of agents to communicate with each other and without the 
support of a well-functioning network of industrial infrastructure.3  
The other component affecting the growth of the knowledge stock of country i (Ai) is 
represented by the knowledge creation term (KCi). We model this as: 
 
KCi = INNiα · θi                                                                                                                    (4)  
 
The first term in this equation (INNi) symbolizes the innovative intensity of a country. This 
refers to both, formalized R&D activities undertaken by profit-motivated firms as well as 
scientific activities carried out by the public research sector. The extent to which innovative 
activities do effectively lead to the creation of new advanced knowledge depends on the 
productivity of the research sector, represented by the second term of the equation (θi). We 
endogeneize the productivity of the R&D sector by means of the following formulation: 
 
θi = TIiθ1 · HKiθ2                                                                                                                     (5) 
 
Equation 5 assumes that the term θi depends on both human capital and technological 
infrastructures. This formulation argues that these two factors do not only have an impact 
on the ability of a country to imitate foreign advanced technologies by enhancing its 
absorptive capacity, but they are also important dimensions in the knowledge creation 
process (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Papageorgiou, 2002).  
Taking logs of equations 2 and 4 and plugging them into 1, the growth of the knowledge 
stock of country i can be rewritten as: 
 
ΔAi/Ai = α logINNi + (θ1 + δ1) logTIi + (θ2 + δ2) logHKi + β logGAPi                               (6) 
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 Equation 6 highlights the four major factors determining the dynamics of the knowledge 
stock in our model. The first term is the intensity of the innovative effort undertaken by the 
country’s R&D sector. The second is the level of technological infrastructures, which has 
an effect on both knowledge creation and imitation (measured by the parameters θ1 and δ1 
respectively). The third term is the human capital level, which does also have an effect on 
both knowledge creation and imitation (parameters θ2 and δ2). Finally, the fourth term is the 
technology-gap, which provides a potential for exploiting foreign advanced technologies. In 
sum, equation 6 provides a rather general formulation that refines previous technology-gap 
models by adding technological infrastructures to human capital as the major factors 
affecting the related processes of knowledge imitation and production.4  
We can now derive the implications of the knowledge stock dynamics for economic growth 
in a standard growth accounting framework. The aggregate production function (expressed 
in per worker term) is: 
 
yi = Ai · kiγ                                                                                                                            (7) 
 
where yi is the GDP per worker of country i,  Ai is its knowledge stock and ki is the level of 
physical capital per worker. The growth of GDP per worker over time is: 
 
Δyi/yi = ΔAi/Ai + Δkiγ/kiγ                                                                                                      (8) 
 
Since the second term represents the investment rate (INVi), we rewrite equation 8 as: 
 
Δyi/yi = α logINNi + a logTIi + b logHKi + β logGAPi + γ INVi                                        (9) 
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 where a = (θ1 + δ1) and b = (θ2 + δ2). The first four terms represent the factors driving the 
growth of technological knowledge pointed out above, while the last one indicates the 
process of physical capital accumulation. This growth accounting equation constitutes the 
basic framework for the empirical analysis that will be presented in the following sections. 
Sections 3 and 4 will focus on the first three terms on the right-hand side of equation 9, in 
order to analyse the patterns and dynamics of technological change in the world economy in 
the last two- decade period. Section 5 will then consider the whole equation and explore the 
empirical relationship between the dynamics of technology and the growth of income per 
capita.    
 
 
3. Data, indicators and descriptive analysis  
The model presented in the previous section highlights three main dimensions of the 
process of technological accumulation: innovative intensity (INN), technological 
infrastructures (TI) and human capital (HK). This section presents a set of indicators and 
some descriptive evidence on these three technology dimensions. We consider a cross-
country sample constituted by 131 developed and developing economies for the period 
1985-2004.5 For each aspect, we make use of the following indicators. 
 
Indicators of innovative intensity (INNOV):6
• Patents: Number of patents registered at the US Patent and Trademark Office per 
million people (source: USPTO, 2004).  
• Scientific articles: Number of scientific and technical journal articles per million people 
(source: World Bank, 2006). 
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 Indicators of (new and old) technological infrastructures (TI): 
• Internet penetration: Number of Internet users per thousand people (source: World 
Bank, 2006). 
• Mobile telephony: Number of mobile phone subscribers per thousand people (source: 
World Bank, 2006). 
• Fixed Telephony: Number of telephone mainlines per thousand people (source: World 
Bank, 2006). 
• Electricity: Number of kilowatt of electricity consumed per hour per capita (source: 
World Bank, 2006).  
 
Indicators of (advanced and basic) human capital (HK):7
• Tertiary enrolment ratio: Share of tertiary students (source: World Bank, 2006).  
• Years of higher schooling: Average number of years of higher education in the 
population over 15 (source: Barro and Lee, 2001). 
• Secondary enrolment ratio: Share of secondary students (source: Barro and Lee, 2001). 
• Years of total schooling: Average number of years of school completed in the 
population over 15 (source: Barro and Lee, 2001). 
• Primary enrolment ratio: Share of primary students (source: Barro and Lee, 2001).  
• Literacy rate: Percentage of people over 14 who can, with understanding, read and write 
a short, simple statement on their everyday life (source: World Bank, 2006).  
 
The advantage of using a large number of indicators is that we are able to provide a more 
multifaceted description of countries’ technological level than if we were using one single 
indirect measure such as their total factor productivity (TFP). This is particularly important 
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in a large sample that includes countries characterized by very different levels of 
technological and economic development.8 While the main interest of our empirical 
analysis is to investigate the dynamics of technology in this large sample of countries, it is 
useful to start by providing a general idea of the extent of cross-country differences in the 
level of technology.  
We do this by means of a cluster analysis, whose purpose is to explore the existence of 
groups of countries characterized by different technological capabilities. The exercise 
follows a hierarchical cluster methodology, which is a clustering technique able to find out 
endogenously the most appropriate number of country groups. The main result of this 
exercise is that three well distinct technology clubs emerge robustly from the cluster 
analysis.9 The major characteristics of these country clubs are presented in table 1 and 
Appendix 1, and they are briefly described as follows. 
Cluster 1: Advanced. This is the group of more technologically advanced countries, 
composed by a small set of industrialized economies: the traditional leaders, US and Japan, 
Continental and Northern European economies, and Western offshoots (Australia, Canada, 
Israel and New Zealand). Table 1 shows that at the beginning of the period the group is 
characterized by high innovative intensity (on average, around 62 patents and 644 scientific 
articles per million people), well-developed technological infrastructures (in terms of both 
old and new infrastructures), and high levels of basic and advanced education (over 42% 
tertiary enrolment ratio, more than 9 years of total schooling, and nearly 99% literacy rate).  
Cluster 2: Followers. This is a larger group composed by around 70 countries. The core of 
this technology club is constituted by catching-up economies from Asia, the South of 
Europe, the Middle East and Latin America. Compared to the advanced cluster, this group 
shows a much lower innovative intensity. In fact, table 1 indicates that at the beginning of 
the period the innovation gap between the advanced and the followers group is quite huge 
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(nearly 16:1 for patents, 10:1 for articles). Over the period, the technological distance has 
gradually decreased, although the innovation gap vis-à-vis the economies in the advanced 
cluster does remain considerable. On the other hand, the technological distance between this 
second group and the more advanced one is significantly lower in terms of technological 
infrastructures and education levels, and the gap has significantly diminished during the last 
two decades.  
Cluster 3: Marginalized. This is the largest group of countries, mainly constituted by large 
Asian economies plus many African countries. In terms of innovative intensity, this group 
is not only remarkably far from the technological frontier, but also quite distant from the 
follower countries in the second cluster. Table 1 shows in fact that at the beginning of the 
period the technological distance between the followers and the marginalized groups is 
around 273:1 in terms of patents and 19:1 for scientific articles. Regarding the indicators of 
technological infrastructures and human capital, the distance vis-à-vis the followers cluster 
at the beginning of the period is also remarkable, although the gap has gradually diminished 
during the period. 
In short, this empirical description indicates that the first group is rich in terms of both 
innovative ability and absorptive capacity; the middle-income group has a lower ability to 
innovate; and the less developed group does also lag behind in terms of absorptive capacity. 
These results point out the existence of two large technology gaps. The first refers to the 
great distance that separates the group of followers from the technological frontier, 
particularly with respect to innovative activities. The second refers to the huge gap that 
separates the marginalized from the followers clubs, both in terms of innovative intensity 
and of infrastructures and human capital.  
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 Table 1. Main characteristics of the three technology clubs, beginning (t0) and end (t1) of 
the period 
 
  
 
       Cluster 1: 
 
Advanced      Cluster 2: Followers    Cluster 3: Marginalized 
  
 
t0
 
t1
 
t0
 
t1
 
t0
 
t1
 
 
 
 
Patents 
 
61.89 116.12 3.90 9.16 0.01 0.02 
INN 
 
 
Scientific 
articles 
 
644.8 791.4 67.6 110.4 3.6 5.3 
 
 
Internet  
users  
 
51.9 613.8 4.7 225.1 0.0 32.1 
TI 
Mobile  
telephony 
 
49.0 
 
799.2 
 
6.5 
 
444.5 
 
0.2 
 
70.2 
 
 
Fixed  
telephony 
 
429.4 
 
597.1 
 
123.7 
 
262.7 
 
8.3 
 
38.2 
 
 Electricity   
9290.6 
 
12107.9 
 
2626.8 
 
3672.9 
 
223.7 
 
395.8 
 
 
 
Tertiary  
enrolment 
ratio 
 
42.2 66.5 24.4 40.8 4.2 8.2 
 
Years of  
higher 
schooling 
 
0.46 
 
0.75 
 
0.17 
 
0.40 
 
0.03 
 
0.08 
 
HK 
Secondary  
enrolment 
ratio 
98.3 119.1 75.4 90.3 29.7 45.1 
 
 
Years of  
total 
schooling 
 
9.3 10.4 6.1 7.1 2.5 3.5 
 
Primary  
enrolment 
ratio 
5.63 5.87 4.04 4.64 1.95 2.81 
 
 
Literacy rate 
 
98.5 98.9 91.3 94.3 51.6 63.3 
 
Notes: The list of countries included in each cluster is reported in Appendix 1. 
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4. The dynamics of technology 
How have these technology gaps evolved in the last two-decade period? This section 
considers this question by investigating the dynamics of technology over the period 1985-
2004. In line with our theoretical framework, the three dimensions that we look at are 
innovative intensity (INN), technological infrastructures (TI) and human capital (HK). 
Since there exists no prior theory or model indicating how these three dimensions evolve 
over time, our analysis of technological dynamics follows a simple empirical strategy.  
We carry out a standard analysis of (unconditional) convergence for each of these three 
factors, and study how their statistical distributions have evolved in the last two decades. 
For each dimension, a pattern of convergence would indicate that a process of technological 
catching up is in place, meaning that less developed economies have experienced a more 
rapid technological dynamics than industrialized countries. By contrast, a finding of 
divergence would indicate the presence of a cumulative mechanism that is leading to 
increasing disparities between rich and poor countries.10     
The analysis proceeds by considering four different notions of convergence. Two of them, 
β-convergence and σ-convergence, are well known and widely used in applied growth 
theory. In addition, we put forward two new concepts of convergence, Q-convergence and 
cluster convergence, which represent refinements of the standard definitions, and which 
make it possible to shed new light on the evolution of the world distribution of 
technological activities. 
 
4.1 β-convergence and Q-convergence 
We start by considering the standard notion of β-convergence. For each of the three 
technology dimensions, the dependent variable is the (average annual) growth of 
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technology over the period 1985-2004, while the level of the same indicator at the 
beginning of the period is the only regressor. The cross-country regression model is: 
 
ΔAi/Ai = τA + βAAi,0 + εi                                                                                                     (10) 
 
where ΔAi/Ai is the growth of each technology dimension (i.e. ΔHKi/HKi; ΔTIi/TIi; 
ΔINNi/INNi) of country i over the period, and Ai,0  is the log of its level at the beginning of 
the period (i.e. HKi,0; TIi,0; INNi,0). The parameter of interest in these regressions is βA, 
which measures the speed of convergence for each of the three dimensions of technology 
(i.e. βHk, βTI and βINN).  
The first column of table 2 reports these estimated β coefficients, which turn out to be 
negative in all the regressions. All indicators suggest therefore a pattern of β-convergence 
in technology. The speed of convergence is rapid for ICTs infrastructures (Internet: 6,6%; 
mobile telephony: 6%), less so for the indicators of primary and secondary education levels 
(around 2%), and significantly slower for innovative activities, traditional infrastructures 
and advanced education (all lower than 1%).  
The notion of β-convergence provides a simple and intuitive idea of the growth behaviour 
of the average of the distribution of the technology indicators, but it tells nothing about the 
evolution of the whole distribution over time. As such, it is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for convergence (Quah, 1993). It is thus important to look at the convergence 
pattern also from a different perspective. 
We thus propose a refinement of the notion of β-convergence and define it Q-convergence. 
The idea is to study β-convergence by estimating a set of quantile regressions instead of one 
single ordinary least squares (OLS) regression as customary in the convergence literature. 
While an OLS regression estimates the conditional mean function, providing an idea of the 
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behaviour of the average of the distribution, a quantile regression estimates a conditional 
quantile (percentile) function, and thus enables an analysis of the behaviour of different 
parts of the distribution, including the tails (Koenker and Bassett, 1978; Koenker and 
Hallock, 2001).  
In our study of cross-country technological dynamics, Q-convergence is investigated by 
running a set of j quantile regressions for each of the three dimensions of technology: 
 
(ΔAi/Ai)j = τAj + βAAi,0j + εij                                                                                               (11) 
 
where j is the jth quantile of the technology dimension (HK, TI and INN, respectively), i.e. 
the jth percentile of the conditional growth distribution of each technology indicator. In 
other words, for each indicator, we estimate j cross-country regressions, each of which 
measures the speed of β-convergence in technology at a different quantile of the growth 
distribution. Q-convergence is investigated by looking at the vector [βj], where the j 
different components of the vector are the coefficients βj estimated from the quantile 
regressions specified above. By looking at different percentiles of the conditional growth 
distribution, Q-convergence provides a more complete characterization of the dynamics of 
technological convergence than the simple notion of β-convergence is able to do. 
The results for our technology indicators are presented on the right-hand side of table 2, 
where, for each indicator, we report the estimated vector [βj] corresponding to the 20th, 40th, 
60th and 80th quantiles of its conditional growth distribution. For all of the indicators, the 
results show that the β coefficient differs substantially across the distribution. In general 
terms, the speed of convergence is much greater (smaller) at upper (lower) quantiles. 
Besides, for the variables measuring innovative intensity (patents and scientific articles) the 
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estimated β coefficient has a positive sign in correspondence to the lower part of the 
distribution, indicating technological divergence.  
The interpretation of this finding is the following. The regressions that refer to the upper 
quantiles of the conditional growth distribution focus on the countries that have been 
particularly dynamic in the period, i.e. those economies whose growth rate of technology 
has been faster than it could have been expected based on their initial level of technology. 
These regressions investigate therefore the convergence hypothesis by focusing on the well-
performing countries at different levels of development, including the fast-growing 
developing economies (e.g. China), the industrialized countries catching up with the 
technological frontier (e.g. Asian NICs), and the most dynamic leaders. Analogously, the 
regressions referring to the lower quantiles of the conditional growth distribution analyse 
the convergence hypothesis for the low-performing countries in the sample, i.e. for the 
economies whose technological performance has been more sluggish than it could have 
been expected based on their income level at the beginning of the period, including 
marginalized economies falling behind as well as slow-growing industrialized and rich 
countries.  
The results presented in table 2 indicate that when we focus on the upper quantiles of the 
conditional growth distribution we observe a rapid process of technological convergence, 
meaning that a few fast-growing developing economies have been able to develop more 
rapidly than the other (richer) well-performing countries in the sample. This suggests that a 
process of technological catching up is at stake. However, the key point is that 
technological convergence is by no means a characterizing feature of the whole sample. 
When we focus on the lower quantiles of the distribution, low-performing poor countries 
have in some cases not been able to develop their technological capabilities more rapidly 
than industrialized and rich low-performing economies. This is particularly evident for the 
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indicators of innovative intensity, where we indeed observe technological divergence. This 
suggests that, in this part of the conditional growth distribution, a process of increasing 
disparities between developed and less developed economies has been at stake. 
 
Table 2. β-convergence and Q-convergence in technology, 1985-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
β-convergence 
       Q-convergence    
   20
th quantile 
 
40th quantile 
 
60th quantile 
 
80th quantile 
 
       
 Patents  -0.26% +0.19% -0.15% -0.42% -0.54% 
INN Scientific  
articles 
 
-0.06% +0.65% +0.38% -0.22% -0.56% 
 
 
Internet  
users  
 
-6.60% -5.50% -6.43% -7.04% -7.31% 
TI 
Mobile  
telephony 
 
-5.97% 
 
-5.08% 
 
-5.84% 
 
-6.77% 
 
-8.00% 
 
 
Fixed  
telephony 
 
-0.80% 
 
-0.20% 
 
-0.77% 
 
-1.20% 
 
-1.82% 
 
 Electricity   
-0.33% 
 
-0.36% 
 
-0.19% 
 
-0.28% 
 
-0.38% 
 
 
 
Tertiary  
enrolment ratio 
 
-0.72% 0.00% -0.75% -0.84% -1.43% 
 
Years of  
higher schooling 
 
-0.87% 
 
-0.49% 
 
-0.86% 
 
-1.15% 
 
-1.51% 
 
HK 
Secondary  
enrolment ratio -2.00% -1.56% -2.22% -2.47% -2.77% 
 
 
Years of  
total schooling 
 
-1.03% 0.00% -1.02% -1.19% -1.45% 
 Primary  enrolment ratio -1.60% -1.28% -1.60% -1.72% -1.79% 
 
 
Literacy rate 
 
-2.12% -1.61% -1.89% -2.44% -3.03% 
 
Notes: The first column reports the β-convergence coefficient estimated from OLS regression 10. The other four 
columns report the coefficients of convergence βj estimated from quantile regressions 11, where j is the jth 
percentile of the conditional distribution of the growth rate of each technology indicator.  
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4.2 σ-convergence and cluster convergence 
The idea of σ-convergence is to study whether the dispersion of a target variable has 
increased or decreased over time, thus providing a synthetic measure of the dynamics of the 
variability of its distribution.11 Table 3 presents the results of the analysis of σ-convergence 
for our technology indicators. The first two columns report the coefficient of variation of 
each indicator at the beginning and at the end of the period, and the third column presents 
its rate of change over the period, which represents a synthetic measure of σ-convergence. 
The table indicates that all of the technology variables are characterised by decreasing 
dispersion over time. The speed of σ-convergence is particularly rapid for the indicators of 
ICTs infrastructures (Internet and mobile telephony, more than 50%). The variables 
measuring traditional infrastructures, education levels and innovative activities have also 
experienced a decrease in the cross-country dispersion. However, the coefficient of 
variation shows that the variability across countries is still large at the end of the period, 
particularly in terms of innovative intensity. These σ-convergence results are in line with 
the findings of the β- and Q-convergence analysis presented above, and suggest that, in 
general terms, the evolution of the world distribution of technological activities has been 
characterized by an overall pattern of convergence over the last two decades, although 
different groups of countries have experienced distinct dynamics of technological change. 
In order to look more specifically at the behaviour and relative dynamics of different groups 
of countries, we propose a second refinement of the convergence concept.  
The concept of cluster convergence that we introduce here develops naturally from the 
results of the cluster analysis presented in section 3, which have pointed out the existence of 
three technology clubs. A general definition of cluster convergence may be the following: 
Given a statistical distribution partitioned into k clusters, cluster convergence arises when 
the centre of a group gets closer to the centre of the upper cluster over time. For our 
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technology clubs, we therefore observe cluster convergence if the centre of the followers 
(marginalized) cluster has come closer to the centre of the advanced (followers) club, i.e. if 
the technological distance between them has diminished over the period. This notion refines 
the one of σ-convergence because it enables to investigate whether the observed decrease in 
the dispersion of the technology indicators has been determined by a rapid catching up of 
the followers vis-à-vis the technological frontier, or by a rapid catching up of the 
marginalized vis-à-vis the followers, or by both of them.  
The results of the cluster convergence analysis are presented on the right-hand side of table 
3. The table shows that the club of followers has on average decreased its technological 
distance from the advanced group for all the dimensions of technology considered here. 
This catching up process has been remarkably rapid in terms of Internet users and mobile 
telephony, reflecting the worldwide diffusion of ICTs. It has also been quite dynamic with 
respect to innovative activities, which is precisely the aspect where the technology gap 
between the followers and the advanced clubs was more evident at the beginning of the 
period (see section 3). 
When we turn the attention to the dynamics of the marginalized vis-à-vis the followers club, 
however, the picture is different. Here, convergence is rapid in terms of ICTs 
infrastructures, and less so for the indicators of traditional infrastructures (electricity) and 
education. On the other hand, the innovation gap between the marginalized and the 
followers clubs has significantly increased (patents: +35.7%; scientific articles: +10.5%), 
indicating that the group of marginalized economies has not yet been able to intensify its 
innovative efforts, while the other two groups have been much more dynamic in this 
respect. This is in line with the finding of the Q-convergence analysis, which suggests the 
existence of divergence and increasing polarization at the lower quantiles of the 
distributions of these two indicators.12
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 Table 3. σ-convergence and cluster convergence in technology, 1985-2004 
 
 
   σ-convergence  
 
     Cluster convergence 
 
 
 
 
 
Coefficient 
of variation 
in t0
 
 
Coefficient 
of variation 
in t1
 
Rate of 
change 
 
Advanced 
vs. 
Followers 
 
Followers 
vs. 
Marginalized 
  
Patents 
 
3.08 2.65 -13.8% -20.1% +35.7% 
INN Scientific  
articles 
 
2.14 
 
1.93 
 
-9.8% 
 
-24.8% 
 
+10.5% 
 
  
Internet  
users  
 
2.66 1.20 -54.9% -75.4% -92.6% 
TI 
Mobile  
telephony 
 
2.25 
 
1.04 
 
-53.6% 
 
-76.2% 
 
-79.6% 
 
 
Fixed  
telephony 
 
1.36 
 
1.05 
 
-22.5% 
 
-34.5% 
 
-54.1% 
 
 Electricity   
1.46 
 
1.41 
 
-3.8% 
 
-6.8% 
 
-21.0% 
 
 
 
Tertiary  
enrolment ratio 
 
0.89 0.80 -9.9% -5.7% -15.1% 
 
Years of  
higher schooling 
 
1.18 
 
0.90 
 
-23.5% 
 
-31.6% 
 
-7.4% 
 
HK 
Secondary  
enrolment ratio 0.56 0.44 -21.0% +1.3% -21.0% 
 
 
Years of  
total schooling 
 
0.55 0.47 -15.1% -3.0% -16.6% 
 Primary  enrolment ratio 0.53 0.39 -26.6% -9.1% -20.3% 
 
 
Literacy rate 
 
0.33 0.26 -23.6% -2.8% -15.7% 
 
Notes: The first two columns report the coefficient of variation at the beginning and at the end of the period 
respectively (the coefficient of variation is defined as the standard deviation divided by the mean). The third 
column shows the rate of change of the coefficient of variation over time, which is a measure of σ-
convergence in the period 1985-2004. The fourth (fifth) column reports the rate of change of the technology 
gap between the advanced (followers) and followers (marginalized) clubs. These rates of change represent our 
measure of cluster convergence, and have been calculated by comparing the levels of the technology gaps at 
the beginning and at the end of the period. 
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5. The link between technological and income dynamics 
The findings of the previous section indicate that the group of indicators that have 
experienced the most rapid pace of technological convergence are those measuring ICT-
related infrastructures, i.e. Internet and mobile telephony, while more traditional 
infrastructures (electricity and fixed telephony) have been converging at a much slower 
pace. The world distribution of human capital is also characterized by an overall process of 
convergence, although the speed of convergence has been faster for the indicators of basic 
education (primary and secondary schooling) than for those measuring tertiary education. 
By contrast, the other important dimension of technology outlined in the model, the 
innovative intensity, has experienced a different dynamics, since middle-income countries 
have been able to partly close the technology gap, while the group of less developed 
economies has not. With respect to this dimension, we therefore observe increasing 
polarization between rich and poor countries, and the progressive catching up (or vanishing) 
of the middle-income group.   
This dynamics resembles closely what Quah (1996a; 1996b; 1996c; 1997) called emerging 
twin-peaks. Quah’s well-known empirical result refers however to the evolution of the 
cross-country distribution of income, rather than the dynamics of technology. This leads to 
pose one relevant question: what is the relationship between the dynamics of technology 
and the growth of income, and what are the dimensions of technology that are most closely 
related to economic growth? We analyse this question by means of two conclusive 
exercises. 
The first is to repeat the convergence analysis undertaken in the previous section by 
focusing on the dynamics of GDP per capita in the period 1985-2004. Tables 4 and 5 
present the results of the four convergence tests that have been used to analyse 
technological convergence in section 4, namely the β-, Q-, σ- and cluster-convergence tests. 
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The results indicate that, differently from most of the technology indicators, income per 
capita has been characterized by an overall pattern of divergence, where poor countries 
have not in general been able to grow more rapidly than richer economies (see table 4). In 
addition, the cross-country variability of the distribution has increased by about 9%, and 
this has mainly been due to the increasing income gap between marginalized economies and 
the rest of the world (see table 5). These findings show that, even when we focus on a more 
recent period than Quah did, the emerging twin-peaks pattern is still evident.  
The key point for our analysis is therefore that the evolution of the world income 
distribution in the last two decades has followed a pattern very similar to that experienced 
by the dynamics of innovative activities, since both of them are characterized by increasing 
polarization between rich and poor countries.13  
 
Table 4. β-convergence and Q-convergence tests for the GDP per capita, 1985-2004  
 
 
β-convergence 
 
              Q-convergence   
 20
th quantile 
 
40th quantile 
 
60th quantile 
 
80th quantile 
 
 
+0.19% 
 
+0.62% +0.41% +0.19% -0.34% 
 
 
Table 5. σ-convergence and cluster convergence tests for the GDP per capita, 1985-2004 
 
 σ-convergence  
 
           Cluster convergence 
 
 
 
Coefficient of 
variation in t0
 
 
Coefficient of 
variation in t1
 
Rate of change 
 
Advanced 
vs. 
Followers 
 
Followers 
vs. 
Marginalized 
 
0.99 
 
1.08 +8.8% -2.9% +9.4% 
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The second exercise that we carry out in order to study the relationship between the 
dynamics of technology and the growth of GDP per capita is to analyse the link between the 
former and the latter in a panel model setting. We do this by estimating equation 9 (see 
section 2), which decomposes the growth of GDP per capita into the sum of the dynamics 
of technology and the rate of physical capital accumulation. The empirical version of this 
growth accounting equation is:14
 
Δyi/yi = γ INVi + α logINNi + a logTIi + b logHKi + β logyi – β logyL                             (12) 
 
where yL is the GDP per capita of the leader country (hence the last two terms of the 
equation correspond to the term logGAPi of equation 9). In a panel data setting, where a full 
set of country-specific and time-specific effects can be added to the set of explanatory 
variables, equation 12 can be written as:  
 
logyi,t =  (1 + β) logyi,t-1 + γ INVi,t-1 + α logINNi,t-1 + a logTIi,t-1 + b logHKi,t-1 + ηi + µt – β 
logyL,t-1 + εi,t                                                                                                                        (13) 
 
where ηi represents the set of country-specific effects and µt  is the time-specific component. 
We may also define (µt – β logyL,t-1) = ρt since these two terms are invariant across countries 
and can both be accounted for in the set of time dummies. By first differencing equation 13, 
we eliminate the country-specific effect ηi and obtain the growth equation specified in first 
differences: 
 
Δlogyi,t =  (1 + β) Δlogyi,t-1 + γ ΔINVi,t-1 + α ΔlogINNi,t-1 + a ΔlogTIi,t-1 + b ΔlogHKi,t-1 + Δρt 
+ Δεi,t                                                                                                                                   (14) 
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 Equation 14 is the empirical counterpart (in panel form) of the reduced form equation of our 
technology-gap model (see equation 9 in section 2). In line with our theoretical framework, 
the dynamic panel specification relates the growth of GDP per capita of country i to the 
dynamics of the following main explanatory variables: (1) the lagged level of the dependent 
variable15; (2) the investment rate; (3) the intensity of innovative activities; (4) the level of 
technological infrastructures; (5) the human capital level. As presented in section 2, the last 
two factors are assumed to have an impact on both the absorptive capacity and the 
productivity of the R&D sector, thus affecting at the same time the imitation capability and 
the innovation ability of a country.16 All technology-related variables are measured by 
means of the indicators presented and analysed in sections 3 and 4. The investment 
indicator is measured as capital investment as a share of GDP per capita, and the latter is in 
log form (both variables are from the Penn-World Tables, version 6.1).  
As compared to the standard OLS cross-country regression framework, the dynamic panel 
specification presents two advantages. First, by including a full set of country-specific 
effects among the regressors, the fixed-effects specification overcomes the omitted variable 
bias that arises in the presence of cross-country heterogeneity (Islam, 1995). Secondly, the 
dynamic model specification takes into account the possible endogeneity of the explanatory 
variables (Caselli et al., 1996). A common strategy in the panel approach to growth 
empirics is to employ Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator, which treats all the 
regressors as endogenous variables and uses their lagged levels as instruments for the 
lagged first differences. This is the method we use to estimate equation 14. As customary in 
the panel growth approach, all the variables are averages over 5-year periods. Since one of 
the variables (scientific articles) is only available for a shorter time span, we consider two 
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different estimation periods. The longer one is 1970-2000 (composed of six 5-year periods), 
whereas the shorter time span refers to 1985-2000 (three 5-year periods).17  
Table 6 presents the estimation results. The tests reported in the lower part of the table 
confirm the validity of the instruments (Sargan test) and the absence of second-order 
autocorrelation. The bottom of table presents the results of three panel unit root tests 
(Levin-Lin-Chu, Im-Pesaran-Shin, and Fisher), which all reject the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity of the GDP per capita series. 
The upper part of table 6 reports the estimation results. The lagged GDP per capita variable, 
as expected, has a positive and significant estimated coefficient, which in the context of our 
technology-gap model is interpreted as evidence of a catching up mechanism linked to the 
international diffusion of advanced technologies. The investment variable is also positive 
and significant in the estimations, confirming the important role of the process of physical 
capital accumulation for economic growth. 
Innovative activities are measured by means of two variables, the patent indicator and the 
scientific articles variable (the latter available only for the shorter time span). Both of them 
turn out to be positively related to the dynamics of income per capita, and their estimated 
coefficients are significant and quite stable throughout the regressions. This result is in line 
with the convergence analysis previously presented, which has shown that the dynamics of 
both innovative activities and GDP per capita is characterized by increasing polarization 
between rich and poor countries and the gradual catching up (or vanishing) of the middle-
income group. Our model interprets this empirical pattern as evidence of the important role 
played by innovative activities for economic dynamics, and as an indication that one major 
reason behind the increasing income disparities in the world economy is related to cross-
country differences in the intensity of innovative efforts.   
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The next four variables measure the role of human capital (secondary and higher education) 
and technological infrastructures (electricity and fixed telephony18). One of these indicators, 
the electricity variable, is highly correlated to the other measures of human capital and 
infrastructures, thus leading to a problem of multicollinearity in the regressions. For this 
reason, we also report the results of regressions that do not include the electricity variable, 
and which are therefore able to estimate with greater precision the effect of the other 
regressors (see columns 1, 3, 4 and 6).  
The two variables measuring human capital are positive and significant in most of these 
experiments. The higher education variable, in particular, appears to have a stronger impact 
on income per capita in the shorter than in the longer period. Interestingly, while previous 
analyses frequently failed to identify a positive and significant relationship between human 
capital and growth (see discussions in Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994, and Pritchett, 2001), our 
finding suggests that more advanced education levels are indeed correlated with economic 
growth in the last two-decade period in a panel data setting, and that tertiary education is 
progressively becoming a more crucial aspect to explain cross-country differences in 
economic performance. 
The two indicators of technological infrastructures, electricity and fixed telephony, are also 
positive and significant (see columns 2, 3, 5 and 6). This provides support for the 
hypothesis pointed out by our theoretical model. Technological infrastructures matter for 
the growth and development process since they may contribute to strengthen the absorptive 
capacity of a country as well as the productivity of its research activities. In fact, the 
regressions presented in columns 2, 3, 5 and 6, which add technological infrastructures to 
human capital, provide evidence for this hypothesis and improve the standard formulation 
based on human capital alone, which is the base specification tested in columns 1 and 4 
(e.g. Benhabib and Spiegel, 1984; Papageorgiou, 2002). 
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Summing up, the analysis undertaken in this section indicates that the world distribution of 
GDP per capita is characterized by increasing polarization between rich and poor 
economies, and that this dynamics is closely related to the following main factors: (1) the 
process of physical capital accumulation; (2) a catching up mechanism linked to the 
international diffusion of advanced technologies; (3) technological infrastructures and 
human capital, which can foster both the ability of a country to imitate foreign technologies 
and the productivity of its R&D sector; (4) the intensity of innovative activities.  
Our analysis of technological convergence in the previous section indicates that, while the 
third factor (conditions supporting knowledge imitation and creation) is characterized by an 
overall process of cross-country convergence, the fourth one has experienced divergence 
and a pattern of increasing polarization between rich and poor countries. Innovative 
activities represent therefore a crucial dimension that developing economies should more 
actively upgrade and focus on during the catching up process. 
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Table 6. Growth accounting regressions – Results of dynamic panel model estimation 
(Arellano-Bond GMM estimator) 
 
 
 
Longer period: 
panel 1970-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
        Shorter period: 
        panel 1985-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
(5) (6) 
 
∆GDPPC 
 
0.7016 
(43.72)*** 
 
0.5384 
(21.71)*** 
 
0.5906 
(26.34)*** 
 
0.5602 
(50.97)*** 
 
0.4899 
(23.98)*** 
 
0.5377 
(27.87)*** 
∆INV 0.1732 (13.05)*** 
0.1196 
(7.52)*** 
0.1791 
(11.33)*** 
0.1789 
(14.38)*** 
0.1205 
(13.69)*** 
0.1584 
(11.00)*** 
∆INN  
(Patents) 
0.0434 
(13.98)*** 
0.0473 
(13.25)*** 
0.0591 
(25.20)*** 
0.0437 
(23.37)*** 
0.0248 
(6.07)*** 
0.0432 
(18.11)*** 
∆INN  
(Articles)    
0.0845 
(13.51)*** 
0.0616 
(8.18)*** 
0.0818 
(15.98)*** 
∆HK  
(Secondary)  
0.0022 
  (0.20) 
-0.0174 
   (1.19) 
0.0532 
(3.30)*** 
-0.0177 
  (1.28) 
-0.0349 
 (1.68)* 
0.0291 
(2.02)** 
∆HK 
(Higher) 
0.0463 
(5.89)*** 
-0.0342 
(4.68)*** 
0.0259 
  (1.64)* 
0.0565 
(6.56)*** 
-0.0609 
(5.44)*** 
0.0383 
  (5.94)*** 
∆TI 
(Electricity)  
0.1988 
(9.26)***   
0.2229 
(28.62)***  
∆TI 
(Telephony)  
0.0064 
  (2.04)** 
0.0144 
(11.23)***  
0.0055 
 (1.19) 
0.0079 
  (5.60)*** 
Constant 0.0089 (3.57)*** 
0.0102 
(3.42)*** 
0.0114 
(4.95)*** 
0.0144 
(4.65)*** 
0.0226 
 (7.67)*** 
0.0048 
   (1.57) 
Time dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan test 68.12 55.60 57.59 56.87 55.64 56.09 
Autocorrelation (1) 
 
-3.83*** 
 
-3.76*** -3.86*** -2.73*** -2.63*** -2.73*** 
Autocorrelation (2) 0.36 1.34 0.50 -0.08 0.84 -0.15 
Wald χ2
 
7626.69 
 
3641.37 19749.9 40926.7 27083.1 235256.8 
Countries 74 67 68 65 63 64 
Observations 
 
428 
 
339 342 184 177 180 
 
Panel unit root tests 
 
 
LLC (4) 
-4.41*** 
 
 
LLC (5) 
-5.37*** 
 
 
IPS (4) 
-5.24*** 
 
 
IPS (5) 
-6.30*** 
 
 
FT (4) 
-2.64*** 
 
 
FT (5) 
-3.44*** 
 
 
Notes: Arellano and Bond GMM two-step estimator. T-statistics between parentheses.  
*** Significance at 1% level; ** Significance at 5% level; * Significance at 10% level. 
The panel unit root tests have been carried out on the log GDP per capita series (yearly data) for the countries 
included in the regressions. All three tests (LLC: Levin-Lin-Chu; IPS: Im-Pesaran-Shin; FT: Fisher type test) 
include a constant and a time trend in the augmented Dickey Fuller equation. The number of lags have been 
selected based on the AIC (the numbers between parentheses indicate the maximum number of lags that have 
been considered for each test). 
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6. Conclusions  
Countries in the world economy are characterized by remarkably different levels of 
technological development. The paper has shown that there exist, in particular, three 
distinct technology clubs. The technology gaps that separate these country groups are large 
with respect to all the main dimensions of technology that have been considered by our 
theoretical model, namely human capital, technological infrastructures and innovative 
activities. This fact is relevant because, before implementing policies aimed at developing 
the knowledge base of a country, it is important to carefully assess its strengths and 
weaknesses, and its relative position vis-à-vis more advanced countries. Since countries can 
only imitate and adopt technologies that are appropriate to their development level (Basu 
and Weil, 1998), technology policies should also be appropriate and specifically targeted to 
a set of country-specific possibilities and objectives. Our findings suggest, in particular, that 
the current emphasis on the need for developing countries to invest and rapidly adopt ICT-
related infrastructures should be complemented by an equally great effort to build up and 
upgrade more traditional infrastructures.  
Notwithstanding the existence of large technology gaps, the empirical evidence on the 
technological dynamics across countries provides some encouraging indications. In the last 
couple of decades, less developed economies have in fact been able to partly close the large 
distance separating them from the other two groups in terms of both human capital and 
technological infrastructures. These two factors are important because they may contribute 
to strengthen a country’s absorptive capacity as well its innovative capability. The 
convergence pattern experienced by these two dimensions in the last two-decade period is 
crucial not only for the impacts it has had on the dynamics of income, but also because 
human skills and technological infrastructures constitute important aspects of welfare. In 
other words, they are not simply means to achieve economic progress, but do also constitute 
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achievements that are directly relevant for human development, representing therefore 
important targets for policy. 
The dimension of technology where developing economies have not yet achieved 
considerable progress, and where they have actually experienced an increase in the 
technology gap, refers to the intensity of innovative activities. The latter dimension is in 
fact characterized by a process of increasing disparities between rich and poor economies, 
which closely resembles the evolution of the world income distribution. Innovative 
activities represent therefore a crucial dimension that developing economies should more 
actively upgrade and focus on during the catching up process. 
In order to get closer and eventually jump to the innovation development stage, developing 
economies should implement an appropriate combination of policies that takes into account 
the need to simultaneously develop R&D activities, traditional infrastructures, ICTs and 
advanced human skills. Referring to this latter aspect, our analysis has in fact shown that, as 
developing and middle-income countries get closer to the technological frontier, tertiary 
education becomes the most crucial aspect of human capital, while primary and secondary 
education progressively become less relevant factors to explain differences in economic 
performance across countries.  
In sum, the perspective adopted in this paper and the related empirical findings suggest that 
the interaction among different dimensions of technology constitutes a crucial factor of 
growth and catching up. Policies aimed at closing the technology gap should therefore 
undertake an active effort to simultaneously build up and upgrade the various 
complementary aspects that constitute each country’s capability to imitate foreign 
technologies and its ability to create new advanced knowledge.   
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Appendix 1: The composition of the technology clubs 
 
Cluster 1: Advanced: 
Japan, US, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
Sweden, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Israel. 
 
Cluster 2: Followers: 
Honk Kong (↑), South Korea (↑), Singapore (↑), Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Fiji, 
Austria (↑), Belgium (↑), France (↑), Luxembourg, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, 
Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United 
Arab Emirates, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Georgia, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan 
 
Cluster 3: Marginalized: 
China (↑), Indonesia (↑), Vietnam (↑), Bangladesh, India, Mongolia, Nepal, Papua New 
Guinea, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Iran (↑), Oman (↑), Yemen, Albania (↑), El Salvador (↑), 
Guyana (↑), Honduras (↑), Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Algeria (↑), Botswana (↑), 
Mauritius (↑), Tunisia (↑), Zimbabwe (↑), Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Congo Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia. 
 
Notes: The arrows indicate those countries shifting towards the upper cluster between the beginning and the 
end of the period. 
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Notes 
 
1. The idea that technology is a major factor to explain cross-country differences in growth performance is 
also supported by a growing number of empirical works (e.g. Hall and Jones, 1999; Easterly and Levine, 
2001). Overviews of the literature on technology and convergence have been presented by Fagerberg (1994), 
Islam (1999) and Gong and Keller (2003). 
 
2. For instance, in previous decades, the discovery and wide diffusion of GPTs such as telephony and 
electricity have greatly enhanced the interrelatedness and the connections among firms, as well as their 
productive efficiency. More recently, innovations based on ICTs (e.g. mobile telephony, Internet) have 
dramatically increased the network capabilities of economic agents. 
 
3. The multiplicative form employed in equation 3 indicates that HK and TI are assumed to have an 
interaction effect on absorptive capacity. To illustrate this idea, the availability of advanced human skills may 
increase the possibility to make a more productive use of advanced technological infrastructures such as the 
Internet; in turn, Internet and ICT-based networks may enhance the access to data and information, thus 
benefiting more educated workers. 
 
4. In the special case where θ1 = δ1= 0, we are back to the standard formulation where it is only human capital 
that enters the knowledge imitation and creation functions (e.g. Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994). 
 
5. For some of the indicators, data for a large sample of countries are only available for a slightly shorter 
period. The precise time span for each indicator is indicated as follows. Patents: 1985-2003; Scientific articles: 
1986-2001; Internet: 1994-2004; Mobile telephony: 1993-2003; Fixed telephony: 1985-2003; Electricity 
consumption: 1985-2003; Tertiary enrolment ratio: 1991-2003; Higher schooling: 1980-2000; Secondary 
enrolment ratio: 1991-2003; Total schooling: 1980-2000; Primary enrolment ratio: 1980-2000; Literacy rate: 
1990-2004.  
 
6. In addition to those presented here, R&D would have been another useful indicator of innovative intensity. 
However, it has not been used here because its country coverage is much more limited than it is the case for 
the other two innovation variables. 
 
7. For each aspect considered here (tertiary, secondary and basic education), we have chosen to use two 
different indicators, one referring to the period 1980-2000 (source: Barro and Lee, 2001), and the other to the 
period 1990-2004 (source: World Bank, 2006). This makes it possible to check the robustness of our empirical 
results, so to ensure that they do not depend on the time span available for each indicator. 
 
8. Relatedly, one possible disadvantage of using a large number of indicators is that some of them also reflect 
other aspects of the development process like consumption and investment patterns, as it is for instance the 
case for our indicators of fixed and mobile telephony, electricity and education levels. This limitation is, 
however, not easy to overcome, since indicators that try to measure a complex concept such as the one of 
absorptive capacity are inevitably closely related to a country’s overall level of development and, hence, to a 
broad set of other aspects of an economic, institutional and social nature.   
 
9. The cluster analysis has carefully analysed the robustness of these results by experimenting with different 
input variables and different clustering methods. The exercise has also been repeated at the beginning and the 
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end of the period to assess the stability of the results over time. The three-cluster pattern that is presented here 
is robust to these modifications.   
 
10. In other words, the (unconditional) convergence analysis presented in this section does not assume or test 
any theoretical convergence model. By contrast, in the absence of a theoretical framework suggesting how 
these three technological dimensions precisely evolve, our empirical analysis simply aims at measuring the 
direction and rate of change of their dynamics, without relating them to any other possible explanatory factor. 
 
11. The notion of σ-convergence has increasingly been used in applied growth theory in recent years, and it 
has constituted the basis for developing new methods for analysing the evolution of the world distribution of 
income over time (Quah, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c). 
 
12. Note that this result is not affected by the fact that a few fast catching up economies (e.g. China, Asian 
NICs) have passed from the lower to the upper cluster over time. In the analysis of cluster convergence, in 
fact, these few dynamic shifting-cluster economies (listed in Appendix 1) have not been considered as part of 
the upper cluster. If they had been included in the latter, they would have decreased the centre of the lower 
cluster and, hence, they would have biased the evidence in favour of divergence between the two clubs. In 
other words, the analysis of cluster convergence requires that the cluster composition must be held constant 
over the investigation period. 
 
13. This result is consistent with the recent empirical study of Feyrer (2008), which has identified a close 
relationship between the evolution of the world income distribution and the dynamics of TFP.  
 
14. For a related growth accounting exercise in a standard cross-country OLS framework, see Benhabib and 
Spiegel (1994). For more general presentations and discussions of the growth accounting methodology, see 
Easterly and Levine (2001) and Caselli (2005). 
 
15. Note that since the ß coefficient is usually expected to be negative (in the presence of cross-country 
convergence), when the growth equation is specified as in equation (14) the estimated coefficient is instead 
expected to be positive (and smaller than 1, in the presence of convergence). This expectation is also in line 
with the stationarity condition (see the panel unit root tests reported in the bottom part of table 6). 
 
16. Recall in fact the parameter definitions previously set out in section 2: a = (θ1 + δ1); b = (θ2 + δ2). 
 
17. It should be noticed that, while the advantage of the panel dataset is to exploit the time series variation in 
the cross-country dataset, the common disadvantage is that most of the variables are only available in panel 
form for a somewhat more limited sample of countries. The panel regression results presented here do in fact 
refer to a sample of around 70 economies, which is smaller than the whole cross-country sample that was used 
in the previous sections. 
 
18. The indicators of ICT infrastructures considered in previous sections, mobile telephony and Internet, are 
available only for a shorter time span and cannot be used in a panel setting as the other variables. We have 
therefore not been able to consider these ICT-related variables in the panel estimations. 
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